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lN 1"HE SUPREME COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
D. PAUL FERGUSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 8897
JEFFREY PAUL JONGSMA,
J. JACOB JONGSMA, VAUGHN
WILLIAM KAY and ALBERT KAY,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT O·F FACTS
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the
defendant Jeffrey Paul Jongsma, J. Jacob Jongsma and
Vaughn William Kay and against the plaintiff and from
the court's subsequent order denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The action as to the defendant Albert
Kay was dismissed by proper motion at the close of plaintiff's case and without objection (R. 200). As indicated
in the appellant's brief there was a sharp conflict in the
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evidence. In order that the case might be fully understood we make our own statement of facts.
This action arose out of an accident that occurred at
about 11:30 P.M. on August 30, 1957, at 2531 East 4800
South, Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 1, 16, 17). 4800
South is a paved road running east and west. The plaintiff's home was on the north side of said road and the
Broadhead home on the south side opposite the plaintiff's
home (Ex. P-1). The plaintiff testified the traveled
portion of the road was 24 feet wide (R. 31, 32, 66).
The Broadhead truck was par ked on the south side of
4800 South in front of the Broadhead home headed east
(R.18,Ex.P-1).
The defendant Vaughn Kay had been driving a 1946
Ford registered in his father's name, with the defendant
Jeffrey Jongsma as a passenger. Kay and Jongsma were
merely riding around (R 120) and proceeded east up 4800
South Street, at which time they observed the parked
Broadhead truck (R. 121). Being low on gas, Kay decided
to siphon some from the truck (R 121). He parked the
car, with its lights off, headed west on the north
side of the street with its front end about even with
the back of the cab of the Broadhead truck (R. 121, 122,
204-20 5). Kay went over to the truck and as he did so,
Jongsma slid over into the driver's seat. Kay was attempting to knock the cap off when the plaintiff came out
(R. 122, 123).
The plaintiff had been a deputy sheriff of Salt Lake
County, but had resigned in February of 1957 to take
up employment with the Skyline Oil Company. He
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terminated this employment on the 3Oth of August and
had made arrangements to resume work at the Sherif£' s
Office on September 1, 1957. He was not employed as
a deputy sheriff at the time of the accident (R. 63-64).
He was not in uniform and did not at any time tell either
Jongsma or Kay that he was an officer or claimed to be
an officer (R. 152-153).
Prior to going out to the street, plaintiff obtained a
large face three-cell flash light and a .3 8 5-inch barrel
revolver from a drawer in his home (R. 25). He took the
revolver for psychological reasons and, because if you

didn't have a gun, you could not make people stop rrunless
you can overtake them and beat them into submission"
(R. 25-26). Although he made sure the gun was unloaded
R. 26-27), he readily admitted that neither Jongsma nor
Kay knew that it was unloaded, and he intended them to
think it was loaded (R. 73). He wanted to frighten the
boys. He actually threatened to shoot Jongsma (R. 74,
8 5) . He had the gun in one hand and the flash light in the
other (R. 27). He walked out to the middle of 4800
South about 12 feet on a straight line and 20 feet on
a diagonal line from the front of the Kay car (R. 67, 6869) . While standing in this position he observed the car
start to move forward (R. 69, 70). It continued straight
west maybe 3, 5, or 10 feet, during all of which titne (<it
was traveling very slowly" at a speed of one or two
miles per hour. The car thereafter suddenly turned
rather sharply to the left towards him. It was then only
traveling one or two miles per hour and started to acederate. The plaintiff continued in the same spot where he
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had been. In fact, he never moved thereform (R. 32, 33,
69, and 71), despite the fact that he knew the car was
headed directly toward him (R. 3 3). He was aware of
the motion of the car from the time it first started until
the time of the accident (R. 34, 70-71) and was confident of what he was doing. The thought did not occur to
him to move from its path because ((I knew what I was
doing, and I knew how to handle the situation*::-*."

((Q. Well, you felt it was perfectly safe to
remain right in the path of an automobile
that was turning toward you and starting to
accelerate rapidly?
A. That is right.

Q. And as I understand you, you continued to
stand right in that position until the automobile
got within maybe four or five feet of you?
A. Right.

Q. All the time you say it was rapidly accelerating?
A. That is right.

Q. And then you just took one step away so
that the front end of that car just barely missed
you, according to your testimony?
A. It missed me.

Q. And I believe you also testified if you had
desired to you could have 1noved completely out
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of the path of the car, or even the door of the car,
could you not?

A. I could have missed the car completely. I
1nerely stepped. I could have run up to th~_truck,
and I would have been safe.
-- Q. As the car was coming towards you you
could have taken a couple of steps out of its path
and you would have been out of its way of you?
A. That is right.

Q. But you didn't see fit to do that?
A. There was no reason to." (R. 72-73).
He testified that as the front end of the car passed
him, the left door was then thrown open. The impact
did not jar either the flash light or the gun out of his
hands. He had no idea as to the speed of the car at the
moment of the impact (R. 74-77). Later on he testified
it was probably around 10 or 1 5 miles per hour, but could
have been less (R. 83). He hung onto the car, still hol~
ing the gun in one hand and the flash light in the other,
with his arms extending through the open window of the
left door ( R. 77) .
He admitted that he could have gone after the boy
on foot, but thought it was easier to go after the boy in the
car. He admitted that he could easily have got the license
number of the car had he so desired (R. 83-84).
He admitted that if Jongsma leaned away from him
after he attached himself to the car, it was possible that he
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did so to get away from the revolver.
his only explanation (R. 8 5-86).

In fact, that was

He testified that he did not come in contact with any
mail boxes and was still riding on the car when it struck
the post. He did not come in contact with the post itself.
Nor did he lose consciousness. He jumped up immediately and ran as fast as he could over two hundred feet
after Jongsma. He was still holding onto the flash light,
but had lost the gun somewhere between the telephone
pole and where he came to rest (R. 88-90).
The plaintiff testified that after he had attached
himself to the car, he could not get off, as he would have
spun into the side of a parked car (R. 36). He did not
know the identity of this parked car and said it was moved
shortly following the accident. He is the only one who
testified with reference to this car. However, it is significant that from the diagram which the plaintiff drew
and which was offered in evidence as Exhibit P-1, that
there was 37 feet between the point where he attache~
himself to the car and the point where he claimed the
parked car was located.
The defendant Jeffrey Jongsma testified he was 16
years of age, that the plaintiff walked out about in the
middle of the street and stood near the rear of the Broadhead truck about 2 5 or 3 0 feet from the Kay vehicle. Both
he and Kay testified that the plaintiff said, ucome out,
you sons of bitches" (R. 125). They did not come out
and both denied telling the plaintiff uto go to hell" (R.
12 5, 145). Jongsma also denied saying anything to Kay
(R. 126). Jongsma testified that he intended to drive the
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car away to distract the plaintiff's attention so that Kay
could get away (R. 126). He said the motor of the car
was already running and he started up, proceeding straight
west. He never turned toward the middle of the street
(R. 127). He said that the plaintiff said, ((Stop or I will
blow your head off." He was scared when he saw the gun
and didn't think straight and continued ahead, trying to
keep as far away as possible from the plaintiff so that
he wouldn't get caught (R. 128). He denied that he
accelerated sharply but said that he gradually accelerated
(R. 128-129). As he was going by, the plaintiff came
over from the center of the street and ((jumped onto the
car" (R. 207). The car was equipped with a standard
transmission (R. 20 5) but the low gear was broken and did
not work at all. He had to start in second gear (R. 206).
The hinge on the door was toward the front of the car
and it opened from the door post toward the front of
the car (R. 206). The flash light was pointing right in his
eyes so that he couldn't see and the gun was at his head. The
plaintiff said, ((Stop or I will blow your head off." He
then heard the trigger click. He was not thinking straight
and couldn't describe what happened thereafter, as he was
so scared (R. 207-208). He did not recall lying down
in the seat, nor did he consciously accelerate the vehicle.
He did not intend to injure himself or the plaintiff, but
uwas just thinking about whether he was going to shoot
me or not" (R. 208-209). He never saw the telephone
pole into which he collided (R. 209). He never made any
statements to the plaintiff at all. The plaintiff at no time
said ((For God's sake stop" (R. 134). He denied that he
ever pushed the door of the car open and claimed it was
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closed when the plaintiff grabbed onto it (R. 210) . He
never had any idea of what he was really doing after the
plaintiff put the gun at his head, and told him he was
going to kill him (R. 210).
He testified that he did not actually know how the
plaintiff was holding onto the car because he could not
see with the flash light in his eyes (R. 213-215).
He recalled talking to an officer the next morning
and telling him he didn't know how fast he was going when
he struck the pole. The officer told him he had to give
him something for the record, and he therefore gave him
an arbitrary figure, but did not actually know how fast
he was going ( R. 218 ) .
According to the pretrial order the plaintiff's position was that Jongsma ({wilfully undertook such action
as he thought would frighten the plaintiff, but without
intending to injure" (R. 9) . The plaintiff indicated that
this was likewise his intention when he took the revolver
and attempted to apprehend Jongsma and Kay. (R. 15 5156).
Appellant claims that the defendant Jongsma was
not corroborated by anyone, but that the testimony of the
plaintiff was corroborated. This is wholly incorrect. No
plaintiff's witness testified as to the circumstances that
transpired from the time the plaintiff reached the middle
of the street, and the actions of the plaintiff and the defendant Jongsma thereafter. The plaintiff's son, Paul
Ferguson, testified that he had heard someone stealing
gasoline and came into the house and notified his father,
but he readily admitted that he was on the porch of the
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house when the incident took place; that he could not
see where his father was located as his view was blocked
by son1e bushes (R. 168). He did not see the car start
up (R. 175) and was not aware of anything that transpired after his father had left the driveway and went out
of his vision until he later saw him down by the telephone pole (R. 176).
The defendant Kay, from his position behind the
truck, did not actually see the car move forward and
thereafter he started to run away, so that he did not know
what had transpired until after the incident was all over
(R. 146 and 221).
The case as presented to the jury, therefore, involved a choice as to whether it would believe the version
as given by the defendant Jongsma or the version as
given by the plaintiff. The conflict between the testimony of these parties on the essential particulars was
so sharp that the jury had the choice of believing one or
the other. By its verdict it is clear that the jury adopted
Jongsma's version of the accident.
Appellant makes reference to the serious nature of
the plaintiff's injury. In this connection Dr. Ronald W.
King, the plaintiff's attending doctor, testified that on
the evening of the accident, the plaintiff was ambulatory
and walked into his office (R. 107-108). His injuries
at that time consisted of a bruised right elbow (R. 101),
an abrasion of the left wrist and forearm where the skin
was rubbed off, a hematoma on the right thigh extending
up a little into the groin, and a large abrasion of each
buttocks. He was suffering from a degree of light shock
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(R. 102). The doctor dressed his bruises and released
him to his home ( R. 1 0 3 ) • These in juries all cleared up
without incident (R. 108). Plaintiff testified that approxtmately two years prior to the accident he had been
hospitalized for a. perforated ulcer, under the treatment
of Dr. J. B. Fowler. However, he claimed that within six
months thereafter he had recovered and did not experience
any further trouble and had been eating normally for a
year and a half prior to the accident (R. 54) ; that his
health was excellent. He did not know what caused his
first ulcer other than nervousness or emotional stress or
bad eating habits. Two days after the accident his ulcer
hemorrhaged again. The treatment he received for
that was the same as the treatment he received for the
previous ulcer hemorrhage. In each instance he was given
blood transfusions and placed on a special diet and in each
instance he was off work three weeks (R. 93).
He also testified he had been hospitalized for a year
in the Army on account of asthma, for which he had received a 10ft!~ permanent disability rating (R. 9 3). He
admitted testifying by deposition that for over a year
prior to the auto accident he ate what he wanted and
drank what he wanted (R. 94) . The symptoms which
he had in the second hemorrhage were exactly the same
which he had on the occasion of the first hemorrhage
(R. 97-98). In connection ·with his first hospitalization
prior to the accident, he admitted that he must have told
the attending doctor that he ruined his stomach in Burma
(R. 152).
While Dr. King testified that in his opinion the perforation following the automobile accident was caused by
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the accident, he nonetheless testified that any person who
had suffered from a perforated ulcer should maintain
what he termed a chronic ulcer diet for the rest of his
life and that if he went off that diet, that it would
increase the likelihood of a hemorrhage recurring (R.
111 ) . He said that the diet on which he now had the
plaintiff was the same that the plaintiff should have
had following his first ulcer episode (R. 110). He also
testified that most hemorrhaging of ulcers was caused by
anxiety or eating habits, stress or strain, rather than by
accident.

It was not contended that the plaintiff's hospitalization was due to anything other than the hemorrhaging of
the ulcer. The plaintiff admitted that he returned to
work within three weeks following the accident and was
thereafter performing all of his duties (R. 92). The doctor testified that a person generally recovered from an
ulcer within a period of three to four months from its
occurrence ( R. 114) .
Appellant claims that Jongsma changed his testimony
about the manner in which the plaintiff was hanging
onto the car. This was admitted by Jongsma, who stated
that he was confused when examined as an adverse witness
by plaintiff's counsel. He testified, however, that with
the flash light in his eyes and the gun at his head, he
could not actually see how the plaintiff was hanging onto
the car. He definitely denied opening the door on the
plaintiff (R. 210). The jury by its verdict believed
Jongsma's testimony and was not impressed by counsel's
argument about the discrepancies. The factual issue was
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decided against the plaintiff and is not raised on this
appeal.
Both at the trial and in his brief plaintiff attempted
to characterize Jongsma and Kay as culprits. The jury
was not impressed by this line of argument and, as a matter of fact, there was nothing in the evidence to show
that Jongsma had ever been involved in any prior trouble.
Kay admitted one previous attempt at stealing gasoline,
for which he was apprehended. On the other hand, the
plaintiff was portrayed to the jury by his testimony as a
brazen and foolhardy person who threw all caution to
the wind, who acted recklessly in using a revolver in an
attempt to frightt:n and apprehend two juveniles; that he
recklessly jumped on the moving car to accomplish his
avowed purpose and recklessly pointed a revolver at Jongsma's head, flashing a light in his eyes, and threatened to
blow his brains out. The jury had the opportunity of
seeing and observing the actions and demeanor of the
witnesses as well as hearing their testimony and the jury,
from its verdict, chose to believe Jongsma's version of the
accident.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO CHARGE THE
JURY THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS
NO DEFENSE TO WILFUL, W ANTO·N OR RECKLESS MISCO·NDUCT AND IN CHARGING THE
JURY ON SAID DEFENSE WITHOUT REGARD TO
THE ALLEGED WILFUL, WANTON AND RECKLESS CO·NDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 16,
WHICH CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW OF THE
CASE AND WHICH DID NOT SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF 0'N THE ISSUES OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT CO·MMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NOS.
16, 17 18, 19, AND 20, WHICH CORRECTLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMED RISK TO
THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
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POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY THAT THE LAW REQUIRES MOTORISTS
TO DRIVE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY.
POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.7 PERTAINING TO THE DUTY
OF THE PLAINTIFF WHEN CONFRONTED WITH
SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED PERIL.
POINT VI.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE
PLAINTIFF TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT KAY WITH REFERENCE TO CONVERSATIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE APPELLANT'S INJURIES.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERRO,R IN REFUSING TO CHARGE THE
JURY THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS
NO DEFENSE TO WILFUL, WANTON OR RECKLESS MISCONDUCT AND IN CHARGING THE
JURY ON SAID DEFENSE WITHOUT REGARD TO
THE ALLEGED WILFUL, WANTON AND RECKLESS CONDUCT 0'F THE DEFENDANTS.
The appellant contends that the defendant Jongsma
was guilty of wilful, wanton and reckless conduct and
that by reason thereof contributory negligence was no
defense. While this may be true as a general proposition,
it was not true under the facts in this case.
Plaintiff complains of the court's failure to give his
requested instruction No. 12, which reads as follows:
((You are instructed that it is no defense so far
as the injuries to Mr. Ferguson are concerned that
he was guilty of negligence contributing to his
injuries, if the conduct of the defendant Jeffrey
Jongsma in the operation of the Ford automobile
amounted to wilfulness, wantonness or recklessness.
((In this regard if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant Jeffrey
Jongsma intentionally turned the automobile he
was operating in the direction of the plaintiff and
drove said automobile directly at the plaintiff or
that the defendant Jongsma intentionally opened
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the door of the car he was operatng in an attempt
to strike the plaintiff with said door and if you
further find from a preponderance of the evidence
that such conduct on the part of the said Jongsma
was a proximate cause of the injuries of plaintiff,
then you are instructed that the plaintiff is entitled
to recover regardless of any negligence on his part."
This instruction is erroneous when applied to the
facts in this case. The first paragraph is not even a correct statement of the law. At best it is only half true. It
also included a wilful act which had been expressly eliminated from the case by the pretrial order.
See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law
of Torts, Vol. 2, page 1262, Subdivision (2):

--\

rr A plaintiff is barred from recovery for, harm
caused by the defendant's reck)ess disregard for the
plaintiff's safety if, knowing of the defendanfs
reckless 1nisconduct and the danger involved to
him therein, the plaintiff recklessly exposes himself thereto."

Contributory negligence consists of different types
as illustrated in Section 466, page 1230 of the American
Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, which
reads as follows:
HThe plaintiff's contributory negligence may
be either
(a) An intentional and unreasonable exposure
of himself to danger created by the defendant's
negligence of which danger the plaintiff knows
orl has reason to know, or
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(b) Conduct which, in respects other than
those stated in Clause (a), falls short of the standard to which the reasonable man should conform
in order to protect himself from harm."
Included in that class referred to in paragraph (a)
is any voluntary exposure to an unreasonable risk. In commenting upon this type of contributory negligence, the
Restatement of the Law of Torts says:
((This form of contributory negligence is frequently called ~~voluntary assumption of risk."
However, since the plaintiff must not only know
of the danger, but must also encounter it without
any reasonabJe necessity of so doing, his conduct
actually amounts to a voluntary exposure of himself to an unreasonable risk."
See also American Law Institute, Restatement of the
Law of Torts, Section 50 3, page 1299, subparagraph ( 2) ,
which reads as follows:
(((2) An actor whose conduct is in reckless
disregard of his own safety is barred from recovery
against a defendant whose reckless disregard of the
actor's safety is a contributory cause of the actor's
bodily harm."

In other words, while simple contributory negligence
may not be a bar to the action if the defendant Jongsma
acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety, it is
such a bar where the plaintiff himself, knowing of the
defendant's reckless conduct, nevertheless voluntarily
exposes himself thereto.
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See also Rogers v. Chicago Transit Authority (Ill.),
92 N. E. 2d 776. In that case the decedent got mad because two street cars had passed without stopping. When
a third one approached, he went out and stood in the
middle of the track and raised his hand, at which time
the street car was about 120 feet away, was coming rather
rapidly, and directly for him. He did not move from the
track until too late and thereby got struck by the car and
wa,s killed. The jury made a special finding that the
defendant was guilty of wilful and wanton conduct. The
appellate court held that there was no evidence of wilful
or wanton conduct on the part of the defendant but that
the decedent himself was guilty of wilful and wanton
conduct which in any event proximately contributed to
the accident. The court said:
((Contributory wilful and wanton misconduct, if established, is a complete defense to an action charging the same wrong."
See also Schneider v. Brecht (Cal.) , 44 P. 2d 662,
wherein the court said:
((While it is true, generally speaking that ordinary negligence on the part of a plaintiff is not
a defense upon which a defendant may rely when
the complaint is based upon a charge of wilful
misconduct, this overlooks a principle which we
think must be considered, to wit: That where
the negligence of the plaintiff is of such a character that it contributes to, and really becomes a
part of, and the inducing cause of the defendant's
wilful misconduct, 110 recovery can be or should
be had." (Italics ours) .
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See also Prater v. Buell (Ill.), 84 N. E. 2d 676. See
Hinkle v. Minneapolis, A. & C. Range R. Co. (Minn.),
202 N. W. 340, wherein it is said:
((The theory of these variations of negligence
leads to but one logical conclusion, and that is that
the same basic reason which causes contributory
negligence to prevent a recovery in an action sounding in ordinary negligence also prevents a recovery
by one who is guilty of wilful and wanton negligence. Such negligence is just as efficient to offset
the defendant's negligence of the same character as
contributory negligence offsets ordinary negligence. There can be no more comparative wantonness than there can be comparative negligence.
When both parties are guilty of such negligence
neither can be selected as that which is the proximate cause, and hence the law must leave both
where it finds them. The conclusion is inevitable,
even though its application be fraught with difficulties."
See also to the same effect Gulf, Mobile & Ohio
Railroad Co. v. Freund, 183 F. 2d 1005. In Gill v.
Arthur (Ohio), 43 N. E. 2d 894, the court held that a
guest suffering an injury because of wilful or wanton
misconduct of the host driver cannot recover if he exposed himself to an obvious and appreciated danger, holding that one who exposes himself to such a danger, rreven
though he does not appreciate the full extent of the
danger, rassumes the risk' of injury that may result to
him therefrom."
In Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P. 2d
453, the plaintiff was held to have exposed himself to a
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known danger allegedly in exercise of a right and privilege
which he had to use the highways and streets, in connection with which the Utah court said:
((But such right and privilege are not without
limitation and certainly cannot include the prerogative of use without the exercise of due care. It
would seem that a reasonable, prudent person
would not expose himself to a known danger when
there is an easy, known and convenient route
around it. Plaintiff's conduct, aside from the
concept of assumption of risk, was unreasonable
in the light of this known hazard and the existence
of a convenient, hardly burdensome detour at the
intersection of Grant and 18th Street, where the
trench ended and through which plaintiff had
driven shortly before his injury. To deliberately
attempt to cross under such circumstances seems
to be that type of lack of due care not attributable
to the ordinary prudent person exercising care for
his own safety."
Under the plaintiff's version of the accident he
acted in a reckless and foolhardy manner. He watched the
car from the time it first started to move forward slowly,
while it allegedly turned sharply towards him and accelerated. He admitted he could have moved completely away
from the car by taking a couple of steps and he ((would
have been safe." He said he knew what he was doing
and knew how to handle the situation. To remain standing in front of a car which is being turned directly towards
an individual and which he claims is greatly accelerating is
certainly reckless. This is the situation covered in the
Rogers case. Thereafter it was not necessary for the
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plaintiff to jump on the car. Its speed, according to
him, was 1 0 miles per hour or less.; the door, even if
opened, would only have closed by contact with his body.
The impact was slight because it did not jar either the gun
or the flash light from his hands but he nonetheless jumped
on th-. car, still intent upon making it stop. This was
foolhardy and reckless. After getting on the car, according to him, it was traveling 10 miles per hour or less.
He nevertheless continued to ride thereon for a distance
of 37 feet before it reached the car which he alleged was
parked by the side of the road.
The plaintiff admitted that he intended to frighten
Jongsma and Kay, but not to injure them. This is the
same conduct which he claims stamps the stigma of wilful
and wanton upon Jongsma's conduct. In the pretrial
order he claims that Jongsma intended to frighten, but
not to InJure. If such conduct on the part of Jongsma
was wilful, reckless or wanton, then the plaintiff by his
own admission has so characterized his own conduct.
Plaintiff testified that he took the gun for psychological reasons, to frighten the defendants, intending them
to think it was loaded and because if he did not have a
gun, he couldn't make people stop ((unless you can overtake them and beat them into submission." This testimony showed a calloused attitude and utter indifference
on the part of the plaintiff so that the jury could well
find his own conduct in the entire matter was not only
unreasonble, but evidenced a recklessness and vindictiveness on his own part.
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There was the testimony of Jongsma that he did not
turn toward the plaintiff, was keeping as far away from
him as possible, when the plaintiff came over, jumped on
the car, put the flash light in his eyes, the revolver at his
head, and threatened to shoot him. This conduct on the
part of the plaintiff was likewise reckless.
Under this evidence, it would have been error to
have given the first paragraph of the plaintiff's requested
Instruction No. 12. It did not indicate to the jury that
even though Jongsma's conduct was found to be wilful,
wanton, or reckless, that nonetheless the plaintiff would
be barred from recovery if his own conduct, whether
termed contributory negligence or assumption of risk,
likewise amounted to a reckless exposure to danger.
The second paragraph of the requested instruction is
open to even more serious objection. It was not the intentional driving toward the plaintiff or the intentional
opening of the door, if any, which caused the plaintiff's
alleged injury. This part of the instruction attempts to
inject into the case an intentional injury which was expressly eliminated from the case in the pretrial order. It
could, at best, be proper only if the alleged intentional
acts were found by the jury to have been committed in
wanton and reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety
and if the plaintiff did not recklessly or wantonly expose
himself to the danger.
As indicated in the citation quoted by the plaintiff
from Vol. 3 8 Am. Jur. page 8 54, ((So far as wanton conduct is concerned, some discernment must be exercised by
the courts, or the defense of contributory negligence will
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be barred in any case merely by the artifice of describing
the conduct of the defendant as wanton."

It was and is our position that if the defendant Jongsma was negligent, the instruction on contributory negligence was proper. If the defendant Jongsma was guilty
of wilful, wanton or reckless conduct, that the defense
was still proper because the plaintiff's conduct was characterized by the same stigma. To have given the instruction in the form or manner requested by the plaintiff
would have been gross error.
Where a requested instruction is erroneous or misleading, it is not error for the court to refuse to give the
same. See P. A. Sorensen Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. Co.
49 Ut., 45 8, 164 P. 1020. See also to the same effect 53
Am. Jur. Section 525 at page 422, wherein it is said:
((A requested instruction must be calculated
to give the jury an accurate understanding of
the law, having reference to the phase of the case
to which it is applicable. It is, of course, not incumbent upon the trial court to give any requested
instruction which is an erroneous statement of the
law or is otherwise improper under the facts of
the case. The trial court may properly refuse a
requested charge which is unintelligible, incomplete, or argumentative, or which might prove misleading or confusing to the jury; a requested instruction requiring the jury to decide questions of
law; an instruction which is too general or too
broad or omits some qualification or limitation
necessary to make it properly applicable to the
facts of the case; or a request not broad enough to
cover the whole law of the case on the point."
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See also Gill v. Arthur (Ohio), 43 N. E. 2d 894.
The case of laconia v. D'Angelo (N. J.), 142 A. 46,
58 A. L. R. 614, is certainly not in point. In that case the
driver actually pushed a person from the car's running
board. Under those circum.stances the driver consciously
did a wrongful act.
In this case there was evidence of negligence on the
part of each party. There was also evidence of recklessness
on the part of each party. The instructions given were
appropriate. It could make no difference whether the
conduct is described as negligence or wilful, wanton, or
reckless when the evidence indicated that either party
could be found guilty of the same type of conduct. By
whatever name called, the defense would apply.
The court did submit to the jury the issue of wilful,
wanton and reckless conduct in Instruction No. 26 on
punitive damages and quite properly instructed that before any award could be made therefor, the issues generally must be found in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant. As bearing on the punitive damages, the
court in Instruction No. 27 defined recklessness, and in
No. 2 8 defined wilful conduct.
We do not believe that there was any evidence to show
that the plaintiff's injury was caused by any wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct on the part of the defendant
Jongsma. Wilfulness was expressly eliminated by the pretrial order. There was no recklessness. Under the plaintiff's own testimony, the car was about 12 feet to the
east of him and a little to the north, so that on a diagonal
line it was about 20 feet away from him. According to
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plaintiff, the car then moved straight forward very slowly
at a speed of one to two miles per hour for a distance of
3, 5, 7 ,or 10 feet. The car was then approximatey 2 to 5
feet to the east and somewhat to the north of him. At this
time it is claimed the car was turned directly toward the
plaintiff and accelerated greatly. The distance of the
car from the plaintiff at this time would make it physically impossible for the driver to have turned it sharply
toward the plaintiff or to have accelerated in any material
degree from its one to two mile an hour speed. The
plaintiff's testimony in this regard is against the physical
facts and cannot be believed. The front end of the car
did not strike the plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that the door
was thrown open against him. Bearing in mind that the
hinge on the door was to the front and considering the
low speed at which the car must have been traveling, even
under the plaintiff's own testimony nothing would have
happened except for the door on the car to close. The
plaintiff would not have been injured. The impact had
to be slight. It did not jar either the gun or the flash light
from his hands. Up to this point there is no evidence to
support any wilful, wanton, or reckless act which was a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. After the plaintiff attached himself to the car, the defendant Jongsma
was frightened and confused because the plaintiff had the
flash light shining in his eyes and a revolver at his head.
He readily admitted that he did not know what he was
doing thereafter. Plaintiff conceded that if Jongsma
did lie down in the seat, the only explanation was to get
away from the gun. Nothing that Jongsma did thereafter
could be classed as a conscious indifference to the plaintiff's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
rights. If Jongsma was trying to get the plaintiff off the
car so that he could escape, he would not have run into a
telephone pole, thereby wreck the car, and bring about
his own apprehension. The only possible explanation for
the course of the car is the fact that Jongsma was frightened; that he could not see where he was going, and
did not know what he was doing.
See Rogers v. Chicago Transit Authority, supra,
wherein it is said that the conduct must exhibit a rr conscious indifference to consequence." See also Price v.
Schroeder (Cal.), 96 P. 2d 949, wherein it was held that
a guest could not recover for injuries where the mental
condition of the driver, which was the basis of the charge
of wilful misconduct, was induced by the active participation of the guest.
Under the evidence 1n this case it is inconceivable
that the jury could find that Jongsma was operating
the car with a conscious indifference to the plaintiff when
he could not see where he was going and while frightened
by a gun pointed at his head. He was unable to see the
road, did not consciously accelerate the car, and did not
know what was happening.

It must be borne in mind that the plaintiff specifically eliminated any actual intent to injure. He took the
position in the pretrial order that the defendant Jongsma
((wilfully undertook such action as he thought would
frighten the plaintiff but without intending to injure."
This eliminates any actual(intent from the case. See Bartolucci v. Falleti (Ill.), 46 N. E. 2d 980.
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The plaintiff, by his requested instructions Nos. 4,
5, and 6 recognized that the plaintiff's conduct might bar
him from recovery because each of these instructions concluded with the phrase, ((unless you find that plaintiff is
barred from recovery by his own conduct."
There was no error in failing to give the plaintiff's
requested Instruction No. 12.

POINT II.
THE CO~URT DID NOT CO·MMIT PREJUDICIAL ERRO·R IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 16.
THIS INSTRUCTION CO·RRECTL Y STATED THE
LAW OF THE CASE AND DID NOT SHIFT THE
BURDEN OF PRO·OF O·N THE ISSUES OF CONTIUBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION
OF RISK.
The instruction complained of reads as follows:
((In this action before you may return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants Jeffrey Paul Jongsma, Jacob J. Jongsma
and Vaughn William Kay, you must find from a
preponderance of the evidence that each of the
following three propositions are true:
((Proposition No. 1:
ma was negligent.

That defendant Jongs-

((Proposition No. 2: That said negligence was
a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, and
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((Proposition No. 3: That the plaintiff himself was not guilty of contr~utory negligence
and that the plaintiff, by his action and conduct,
did not assume the risk of the occurrence as hereafter defined."
Appellant complains that the instruction is erroneous because the jury must find from a preponderance of
the evidence that Jongsma was negligent and that the
plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. His
complaint is that this shifts the burden of proof. The
appellant must not have thought much of this point because no exception was taken to the instruction on this
particular ground (R. 230). Furthermore, the instruction says nothing about who has the burden of proof on
any of the propositions. It correctly indicates that each
must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
In Instruction No. 6 the court instructed the jury on the
burden of proof and stated that the burden of proof as
to any disputed or controverted fact rests upon the
party who alleges the fact. In Instruction No. 3 the
court instructed the jury that the plaintiff alleged the
defendant was negligent and that the defendant claimed
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or
assumption of risk. The instructions must be considered
together as a whole and when so considered they indicated
that the plaintiff had the burden of proof on the issue
of the defendant's negligence, but that the defendant had
the burden on the issue of contributory negligence. There
was no error in the instruction as given.
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POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16,
17, 18, 19, AND 20, WHICH CORRECTLY APPLIED
THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMED RISK TO THE
FACTS OF THE CASE.
These instructions correctly applied the doctrine of
assumed risk to the facts of the case. They did not ignore
the alleged wilful and reckless conduct of the defendant
Jongsma. The court did not err in refusing to charge
the jury with respect to said conduct. Instructions Nos.
16 through 20 embodied the defendants' theory of the
case. The facts disclosed a sharp conflict in the testimony
between the only parties testifying with reference thereto,
namely, the defendant Jongsma and the plaintiff. Jongsma claimed that the plaintiff ran from a position of safety
over to where the car was being operated, jumped onto
the same, and that thereafter the plaintiff pointed a revolver at his head, threatened to kill him, and held the
flash light in his eyes so that he could not see where he
was going. This was denied by the plaintiff.
The last paragraph of Instruction No. 16 instructed the
jury that if it found from a preponderance of the evidence
that the plaintiff blinded the defendant Jongsma or substantially interfered with his vision by flashing a lighted
flash light in his face, that the plaintiff could thereafter
not complain of any negligence on the part of Jongsma
in failing to keep a proper lookout or in failing to have his
vehicle under proper control or in driving on the wrong
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side of the road because the plaintiff£, in such. event, by
his own action and conduct, assumed the risk of the
driver's inability to see or otherwise properly operate the
automobile under such distracting influence. If the plaintiff jumped onto the car and put the flash light in Jongsma's eyes, as Jongsma testified, he could not thereafter
complain about Jongsma's conduct in operating the car.
In other words, his own actions prevented Jongsma from
properly operating the car. The plaintiff might just as well
have put his hands over Jongsma's eyes and then complained of his operation of the vehicle. The jury had the choice
of adopting Jongsma's version or the plaintiff's version.
There was no middle ground. There was no error in this
instruction.
Instruction No. 17 instructed the jury that if it found
from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
pointed a revolver at Jongsma's head and threatened to
kill him so that Jongsma became frightened and was
unable to keep a proper lookout or properly operate the
automobile under this distracting influence, then the
plaintiff could not complain of Jongsma's failure to keep
a lookout or properly operate the automobile. This was
also under the defendants' theory of the case and properly
charged the jury. If the plaintiff, by his own action and
conduct, as indicated by Jongsma's testimony, induced
Jongsma's confused mental state so that he was unable to
operate the vehicle, the plaintiff could not complain. In
this connection the plaintiff admitted that he had intended to frighten Jongsma. How well he accomplished his
purpose is shown by the results. A person cannot complain of another's mental state or attitude when he him-
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self has induced that state or attitude.
Schroeder (Cal.), 96 P. 2d 949.

See Price v.

Complaint is made of Instruction No. 18, which
charged the jury that if it found from a preponderance
of the evidence that the plaintiff, in the exercise of ordinary care, had an opportunity to move from the path of
the car but failed to do so, that by such conduct he assumed the risk. The plaintiff failed to except to this
instruction on the basis which he now urges.
Here, again, this instruction was on the defendants'
theory and based upon the plaintiff's admitted statement
that he was watching the car at all times, knew what 'was
going on, knew that the car was being turned directly
toward him and accelerated, could have moved from the
path to a position of safety away from the car, but chose
to remain there. We submit that there was no error in
this instruction under the facts in this case.
Instruction No. 19 advised the jury that if it found
that the plaintiff jumped onto the automobile and attempted to hang thereon while the same was in motion, that
he assumed the risk. This instruction was under the defendant's testimony that the plaintiff moved from a position of safety over to the car and jumped thereon, which
was denied by the plaintiff. Here, again, there was no
middle ground. The jury had to believe Jongsma or the
plaintiff. If the plaintiff did in fact move from a position of safety as testified by Jongsma and jump onto the
moving car, he thereby assumed the risk.
In Instruction No. 20, the court instructed that if
the plaintiff failed to get off the vehicle if he had a reason-
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able opportunity to do so, he then assumed the risk of
remaining on thereafter. Here, again, no exception was
taken to this instruction on this particular ground, but
only on the ground that it failed to take into consideration
plaintiff's theory that Jongsma was not entitled to rely
on the defense of contributory negligence or assumption
of risk if his own conduct amounted to wilfulness, recklessness, or wantonness, and that there was no evidence
that the plaintiff had an opportunity to detach himself
from the car. The evidence clearly disclosed that even
under the plaintiff's own testimony, the vehicle was
traveling at a speed of 10 miles per hour or less when the
plaintiff got on it and that it traveled a distance of 37
feet thereafter before allegedly approaching a parked vehicle, during all of which time the plaintiff could have
got off the vehicle had he so desired.
The plaintiff complains that these instructions
amounted to a directed verdict for the defendants. This
is not the case. The jury had to adopt Jongsma's version
of the accident. The instructions, in any event, must be
considered in their entirety. Instruction No. 3 outlined
the issues and contentions of the parties with reference to
negligence, contributory negligence, and assumption of
risk and informed the jury that the plaintiff sought to
recover punitive damages because of alleged wilful or
reckless conduct on the part of the defendant Jongsma.
Instruction No. 8 e was given at the plaintiff's request and reads as follows:
ue. There is a legal principle commonly referred to by the term (assumption of risk,' which
is as follows:
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((One is said to assume a risk when he voluntarily manifests his assent to dangerous conduct or
to the creation or maintenance of a dangerous conclition and voluntarily exposes himself to that
danger, or when he knows, or in the exercise of
ordinary care would know, that a danger exists in
either the conduct or condition of another, or in
the condition, use or operation of property, and
voluntarily places himself or remains within the
position of danger."
Instruction No. 23 was also given at the plaintiff's
request and reads as follows:
((In order to find that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of personal injury, you must
find by a preponderance of the evidence that his
words or conduct clearly indicated that he knew
of the danger created by the conduct of the defendant Jeffrey Jongsma, that he voluntarily subjected himself thereto and that he consented that if
injury result the defendant Jeffrey Jongsma should
be relieved of any liability therefor."
In Instruction No. 34 the jury was instructed that
the instructions should be considered as a whole and each
instruction read and understood with reference to the entire charge and not as though one instruction separately
was intended to state the whole law upon any particular point; that the jury should not single out any
certain sentence or any individual point or instruction
and ignore the others, but was to consider all of the instructions as a whole and to regard each in light of the others.
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It is also claimed that a different rule must apply
since the plaintiff had the right to arrest or apprehend the
defendants and was in the exercise of a right or privilege.
This, however does not justify the plaintiff in acting in an
unreasonable manner. See Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Ut.
270, 258, P. 2d 453. See also Restatement of the Law of
Torts, Section 473, page 1243, which reads as follows:
((If the defendant's negligence has made the
plaintiff's exercise of a right or privilege impossible unless he knowingly exposes himself to a risk
of bodily harm, the plaintiff is not guilty of contributory negligence in so doing unless the risk
is unreasonable." (Italics ours) .
In other words, even if the plaintiff is in the exercise of a lawful right to arrest, he does not thereby have
any right to expose himself to any unreasonable risk. The
comment under this section reads as follows:
((In determining whether the risk to which the
plaintiff must subject himself in order to exercise
his right or privilege is reasonable or unreasonable,
the same considerations are decisive which are
stated in Sec. 291, as determining the unreasonable
character of the risk to which an actor has subjected others. In both cases, the value which the law
attaches to the interest to be served by the exercise
of the right or privilege, as compared with the risk
which must be encountered, is of primary importance. Among other considerations to be taken
into account is the existence of an alternative
method by which the right or privilege could be
exercised and the inconvenience and risk involved
in its use. :.'- * :.'- The plaintiff may be barred from
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recovery by exposing himself to a danger created
by the defendant's negligence even though there
is no other method available by which he could
secure the exercise of his right or privilege. Whether the risk is so great that the reasonable man
would forego the exercise of his right or privilege
rather than encounter it depends upon the circumstances of each particular case and, except in situations which have recurred with such frequency as
to lead to binding judicial decision, is a matter for
the judgment of the court and jury in accordance
with the rule stated in Sec. 476."
In this case the plaintiff had alternative methods. He
admitted he could have got the license number. He also
had the boy on foot. He had the choice of going after
the boy in the car or the boy on foot. He could not go
after both, as they were proceeding in opposite directions. He deliberately chose to go after the boy in the
car. Under his version of the accident the jury was entitled to consider that his choice involved an unreasonable exposure to danger. The plaintiff was not confronted with any dilemma. He did not need to go after
the car to apprehend the defendants. He could have
gone after the boy on foot or could have taken the license
number of the car, but he chose to jump on the car
flash the light in the driver's eyes, the gun at his head,
knowing that the boy on foot would thereby get away.
Under the authorities cited, the jury could certainly
consider whether this conduct was unreasonable.
Complaint is also made that the instructions on assumption of risk were erroneous because they wholly failed
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to account for the effect of any wilful, reckless and
wanton misconduct on the part of the defendant Jongsma. This presents practically the same discussion as we
have presented under Point I with the exception that Point
I went to the question of contributory negligence and
the discussion herein covers assemption of risk. The plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 11, and particularly the
first paragraph thereof, is erroneous for the same reason
that the plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 12 is improper. In other words, assuming that assumption of
risk might not generally be a defense to a wilful, wanton
or reckless act, nonetheless, as indicated in our discussion
under Point I, it would be a defense provided the plaintiff's own conduct was done in reckless disregard of his
own safety or that his own conduct amounted to recklessness under the circumstances.
What was said regarding the second paragraph of the
plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 12 under Point I
likewise applies to the second paragraph of the plaintiff's
requested Instruction No. 11. In other words, the harm
in this type of an instruction is in attempting to have
the jury characterize the defendant's conduct alone as
being reckless without letting it use the same yardstick in
interpreting whether the plaintiff's conduct was likewise
reckless. This is particularly true in this case where the
plaintiff testified that he knew everything that was going on, had watched the car from the time it first started
forward, failed to move from its path notwithstanding he
admitted he had such an opportunity, that his actions
were designed to_ frighten_ the defendants ~ut not injure,
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and by his very attitude in indicating that if he hadn't
taken the gun, he might have had to beat the defendants
into submission. The conduct of the two was exactly
the same. If such conduct was only negligence on defendant's part, it was contributory negligence on the
plaintiff's part. If it amounted to recklessness or wilfulness on the defendant's part, then it likewise amounted
to recklessness and wilfulness on the plaintiff's part. In
either case it would have been a bar to recovery. Plaintiff cannot escape the effect of the law by attempting to
state that contributory negligence or assumption of risk
is no defense if the defendant's action is reckless or wanton when the testimony in the case likewise shows that the
plaintiff's conduct can likewise be stamped with the same
stigma.
The instruction is subject to the same further objection as indicated in Point I that it was not the driving
of the car toward the plaintiff or the alleged opening of
the door that caused the accident in any event. The
instruction was improper in addition because it included
a wilful act which had been expressly eliminated by the
pretrial order and by the plaintiff's own contention that
the defendant intended to frighten but not to injure.
Plaintiff complains of the use of the words in certain
of the instructions that if the plaintiff failed to move
from the path of the car in the exercise of ordinary and
reasonable care or if he had an opportunity in the exercise of reasonable care to get off the car, then he assumed
the risk. There was no error in the instructions as given
and in the refusal to give the plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 11.
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POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI·CIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY THAT THE LAW REQUIRES MOTO·RISTS
TO DRIVE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY.
The plaintiff complains of the court's failure to give
his requested Instruction No. 8 which stated as a bald fact
that Jongsma was guilty of negligence if he was driving
on the wrong side of the road. This instruction wholly
ignored the hotly contested issue in the case that if Jongsma
was driving on the wrong side of the road, it was because
of the plaintiff's conduct in flashing the light in his eyes
and putting the gun at his head so that he could not see
where he was going and was so frightened that he did not
know what he was doing. This instruction would make
Jongsma guilty of negligence, notwithstanding that he
unknowingly got onto the wrong side of the road by
reason of the plaintiff's own conduct. The court did
correctly instruct the jury in Instruction No. 16 in which
the jury was told that it could find the defendant Jongsma
guilty if he knowingly drove on the wrong side of the
road. We submit that under the facts in this case this
was the only type of instruction to which the plaintiff
was entitled. Obviously, if a person gets on the wrong
side of the road because of the action or conduct of another, he cannot be held guilty of negligence. The plaintiff might just as well have put his hands over the
defendanes eyes and then claimed he was guilty of negli-
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gence in getting onto the wrong side of the road as to
put a flash light in his eyes so that he could not see where
he was going. The fact remains that the defendant was
on the wrong side of the road and under the plaintiff's
proposed instruction he would have been guilty of negligence regardless of how he got there which is not and cannot be the law. There was accordingly no error in refusing to give the plaintiff's instruction as requested.

POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
FAILING TO GIVE THE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIO'N NO. 7 PERTAINING TO THE
DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFF WHEN CONFRONTED WITH SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED PERIL.
The plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 7 pertains
to sudden peril and the action of a person under such circumstances. Utah follows the general rule that a person
is not entitled to the sudden emergency doctrine if the
emergency is created by his own conduct. See Gittens v.
Lundberg, 3 Ut. 2d. 392, 284, P. 2d 1115:

rrwhere the plaintif1 creates the per# by his
own fault, he may not thereafter urge the sudden
emergency doctrine to protect himself front a
charge of contributory negligence."
In this case the evidence of the plaintiff clearly indicated that he was not confronted with any emergency.
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As a matter of fact, as he stood in the middle of the road,
he observed the car when it first started to move
forward. He watched it continously thereafter. He
continued standing in the same spot and never moved, notwithstanding that he was aware of the motions of the
car, and notwithstanding that he admittedly could have
missed the car completely by taking a couple of steps out
of its path and would have been safe. The plaintiff
deliberately and recklessly chose to stand in a position of
known danger when he could easily have moved to a
place of safety. Even when the door was alledgedly
thrown open, which, of course, was denied by Jongsma,
the impact of necessity would have been slight. The speed
had to be low because the old car could not possibly
accelerate in the short distance that then separated him
from the car. The impact was definitely light because
neither the flash light nor the gun was jarred out of his
hands. At most, even assuming the door to have been
opened, it would merely have gone closed by the contact
with the plaintiff, and he would not have been injured.
There was no necessity for his jumping on the car, but he
was so hell bent on catching the youngster that he
jumped onto the car. He acted recklessly in jumpinl:>
onto a car which he claimed was accelerating as it approached him. Thereafter he flashed the light in the eyes of
the defendant Jongsma and threatened to kill him. Certainly, there was no emergency with which this plaintiff
was confronted. By his own testimony he was fully aware
of what was going on. The only conclusion is that he
deliberately and recklessly chose to expose himself to a
dangerous condition. Under the testimony of the de-
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fendant Jongsma his a<;tion would have been even more
reckless because he then had to move from a position of
safety over toward the car and deliberately jump thereon.
The lower court felt that the plaintiff was not confronted
with any emergency except that of his own creation, and
we submit that the evidence so shows. To have 'given the
instruction under such circumstances would have been
error.

POINT VI.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE
PLAINTIFF TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT KAY WITH REFERENCE TO, CERTAIN ALLEGED CO,NVERSATIONS.
Complaint is made that both Jongsma and Kay testified that they were frightened and their acts were motivated by fear. The testimony which the plaintiff sought
to ask the witness, Kay, was to the effect that following
the accident and when threatened with a complaint by
Broadhead, Kay allegedly stated that uif a complaint were
filed he and his gang would wipe the Broadheads out"
and that when mention was made that he was in a mess,
he answered: uy es, I am, what are you going to do about
it, God damn you?" What Kay said could have no bearing on the fear which Jongsma had. Kay was not driving
the car. Any statement which he made had no bearing on
any fright which Jongsma might have experienced. Plain-
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tiff further contends that this testimony was admissible
on the issue of credibility and to refute Kay's testimony
that he was frightened and scared. Kay did not testify
with reference to any of the facts in connection with the
accident. He admitted that he did not see the car start
up and did not observe its movements thereafter. Whether
Kay was frightened or not had no bearing on the issues
in this case and since he had not testified to any of the
issues in connection with the actual occurrence, to attack
his credibility on such an insignificant matter which had
no possible bearing on the case is ridiculous. The only
purpose of such testimony was to prejudice the jury against
Kay and Jongsma. It had no bearing on any of the issues
of the case and was properly rejected.

CONCLUSIONS
We strongly submit that all of the evidence in this
case clearly showed that any action on the part of Jongsma was not wilful or wanton or reckless. Wilfulness had
been expressly eliminated from the case by the pretrial
order. There was a sharp conflict in the testimony between Jongsma and the plaintiff, who were the only witnesses who actually testified to the events leading up to
the occurrence. The jury did not believe and no one
could expect it to believe that Jongsma drove into the
telephone pole in an attempt to get away. The fact that
he hit the pole clearly bore out his own contention that
the light was flashing in his eyes, with the gun at his head,
and that he was so frightened he did not know what he

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43
was doing. If his conduct was characterized by the stigma
of wilful or wanton and had he been able to see where he
was going, he might have speeded up, but certainly would
not have driven into a telephone pole and thereby wreck
the car and expose himself to discovery. The court and the
jury had the opportunity of seeing and observing all parties to the action, in appraising not only their testimony,
but their action and demeanor. They simply did not believe the plaintiff's story and felt that the accident occurred in the manner claimed by Jongsma. As indicated by
this court in the case of Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Ut. 2d
392, 284 P. 2d 1115, the jury was in a favored position
to form impressions as to the trust to be imposed in witnesses, to observe their appearance and general demeanor,
and to feel the impact of their personalities. As further
indicated by this court in the case of Heywood v. Denver
& Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 6 Utah 2d 15 5, 307
P. 2d 1 04 5, jury verdicts once rendered should not be
lightly vacated nor interfered with by trial or reviewing
courts. Instructions must be considered altogether and
viewed with tolerance and understanding to see whether
the basic issues were fairly and intelligently presented.
Where that purpose is accomplished, the verdict should
not be nullified for any minor error or inconsistencies. We
submit that the plaintiff has had a full, fair trial, that
the rna tter was adeq ua tel y covered under the court's instructions, and that the jury verdict and judgment entered
below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH & STRONG
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents
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